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Abstract
With cybersecurity constantly in the media outlets with breaches, cybercrime, and cyberwarfare,
it has become a significant concern for all. One of the most recent breaches in the summer of
2021 was the Colonial Pipeline breach, which has proven the country's reliance on these
industrial control systems and networking. The systems were taken for ransom by a new type of
ransomware written in a different programming language. Although the Colonial Pipeline breach
was quickly addressed, the impact of the gas shortage and the response time were alarming at
triaging the breach. However, this attack showed the public how dangerous ransomware could
be, mainly when groups target crucial supply chains and infrastructure critical to the functioning
of a nation's economy. The only proper "solution" to these attacks is a standard solution to many
information security issues, user training. However, the reality of the problem is that even if
computers were one hundred percent secure and infallible machines, which they are not, user
error could still compromise an entire system.
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Introduction
In order to start educating users about ransomware, users must know what it is in the first place.
NIST, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, defines ransomware as "A type of
malware that attempts to deny access to a user's data, usually by encrypting the data with a key
known only to the hacker who deployed the malware, until a ransom, is paid," (NIST,
"Glossary," 2019). In recent years ransomware groups have also begun exfiltrating data in
addition to encrypting it. Ransomware gives them more leverage over the victims, giving
attackers the options of leaking the data over time to encourage a ransom payment or outright
selling the data to the highest bidder if the victim refuses to pay the ransom. These core
principles remain relatively constant regardless of the particular company that was a victim or
the ransomware group that performed the attack. In order to gain a more in-depth understanding
of how ransomware works in the real world, this research will first create a demo for users
unfamiliar with ransomware to get firsthand experience with it in a safe and secure environment.
While simple compared to ransomware used in real-world attacks, it should give anyone who
follows along with a general understanding of the mechanics of ransomware. Next, the research
will provide an example of ransomware used in real-world attacks and analyze its methods to
compromise a system using various malware analysis tools. Lastly, this research will recommend
solutions for creating a layered approach to security against threats like ransomware.

Background Research
MITRE ATT&CK Framework
According to the official website, the MITRE ATT&CK framework (may also be referred to as
Mitre Attack) "is a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based
on real-world observations. The ATT&CK knowledge base serves as a foundation for the
development of specific threat models and methodologies in the private sector, in government,
and the cybersecurity product and service community" ("MITRE ATT&CK®"). The Mitre
Att&ck framework includes Tactics and Techniques. Tactics are the categories under which
Mitre Att&ck classifies Techniques. Tactics are common steps taken by attackers in order to
accomplish whatever their goal may be. Techniques (and sub-techniques) are the nitty-gritty
details of how a specific tactic works. An attacker may deploy many techniques within a singular
tactic or might not use a particular tactic at all; it depends entirely on the attack's goal. For those
unfamiliar with this topic, I have supplied a table below of all enterprise tactics, taken from the
official Mitre Att&ck website:
Figure 1
Mitre ATT&CK Enterprise Tactics
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Note: ("MITRE ATT&CK®").
Mitre attack will be used throughout this research to define actions taken by attackers (Tactics)
and how they accomplish those actions (Techniques). Defining the methodology is critical to the
research because it provides a method to define the risks posed by any form of malware and the
suggested prevention and mitigation measures for each risk. By doing this, the framework
provides a straightforward solution to creating a layered security approach to counter, or at the
very least, detect any attack.
Joe’s Sandbox
Joe's sandbox is a web-hosted cloud application that offers the ability to detect and analyze
potential malicious files. This research will be conducted using the Community Edition of Joe
Sandbox Cloud. According to its website, "It performs deep malware analysis and generates
comprehensive and detailed analysis reports" (LLC, Automated malware analysis). This tool
allows one to perform malware analysis without taking on many of the risks associated with
doing so. Joe Sandbox is incredibly helpful because it makes malware analysis more accessible
and safer simultaneously. For example, the user can supply malware, or the user can search
through the database of malware that has already been submitted for analysis by other
community members.
ShinoLocker
According, to the official website "ShinoLocker is ransomware simulator. The difference
between ShinoLocker and real ransomware is that it never asks for ransom; you do not have to
pay to get the decryption key" (Sh1n0g1 Inc., 2016). During this research, ShinoLocker will be
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a safe and effective means to demonstrate how ransomware works to everyday users. The safety
features are the main factor in the decision to use this software. Executing, Shino Locker
provides you with the encryption key to decrypt your files, and even if it does not work for some
reason, the files are not deleted as they are with actual ransomware. Instead, they are moved to
the recycle bin, restoring them even without the encryption key.
Virus Total
According to the official website, “VirusTotal inspects items with over 70 antivirus scanners and
URL/domain blocklisting services, in addition to a myriad of tools to extract signals from the
studied content. Any user can select a file from their computer using their browser and send it to
VirusTotal. VirusTotal offers several file submission methods, including the primary public web
interface, desktop uploaders, browser extensions, and a programmatic API” (VirusTotal, How it
works – virustotal). Throughout this research, VirusTotal will be used in conjunction with Joe’s
Sandbox to analyze malware that has been deemed too risky to handle using conventional means.
Virtual Machines (VMware)
VMware is virtualization software that allows for the creation of and use of virtual machines.
According to the NIST Glossary, "A simulated environment created by virtualization" (NIST
CSRC, Virtual machine (VM) - glossary). Essentially, a virtual machine is a simulated computer
running off of the resources of a physical computer. This is helpful when dealing with malware
because it creates a logical barrier between the physical machine and the simulated environment.
Therefore, while it is not advisable to use Virtual Machines as a primary defense mechanism
against malware, it is advisable to use them as a secondary defense mechanism in a lab
environment.
Safety/Security Protocols
The biggest security concern in this research is to ensure that it is done safely, without risking
any damage to the University's IT environment. This research has a lot of inherent risks due to
the nature of the subject. In order to ensure user safety, the safety and security protocols
designated here will be used throughout the research. There are a few different phases to this
research, and each phase will have slightly different security guidelines. The guidelines are as
follows:
Phase 1: Demonstration
To follow along with the demonstration, these guidelines must be adhered to in order to
ensure the security of your machine and network:
•
•
•

Only download ShinoLocker from the official website. Other sources could have the
safety features removed
The demonstration should be in a inside a virtual machine
The virtual machine should only be connected to a network to download ShinoLocker
and retrieve the encryption key.
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•

The network should be behind a firewall

Phase 2: Finding Ransomware on the open internet
•
•
•

Only browse the internet from well-secured machines (firewall on the network, antivirus
running, etc.)
Avoid known black-hat hacker sites as well as sites that are known to be dangerous.
DO NOT download anything. Due to the nature of the tools and research, all required to
analyze the ransomware is a link to the file download.

Phase 3: Ransomware Analysis
•
•

DO NOT download anything.
Only use reputable sites to corroborate code analysis.

Hypothesis
This research seeks to answer the following questions:
•
•
•
•
•

How hard is it to find ransomware on the open internet?
How easy is ransomware to deploy?
How does ransomware work?
What tools and methods are available and effective for the detection and prevention of a
ransomware attack?
How do you train the general public to help prevent ransomware attacks?

Given these questions, this research seeks to accomplish these objectives:
•
•
•

First, create a reproducible demonstration of how ransomware works for educating the
general public.
Perform analysis on an example of ransomware from the real world to demonstrate the
tactics and techniques commonly used throughout different strains of ransomware
Discuss prevention and mitigation measures to create a layered security approach to
detect and respond to ransomware incidents.

Demonstration/Project Setup
Equipment and Software Required
For the demonstration, there are only a few necessary things:
•
•
•
•

Virtualization Software
Windows License Key or VM snapshot
ShinoLocker
Some form of antivirus (Windows Defender will work)

5

The virtualization software allows one to create a virtual machine for the demonstration, and
ShinoLocker is the ransomware we will be using. The Virtualization software used in this
research will be a VMware workstation, but any virtualization software will work.
How to Implement/operate
First, open a virtual machine using your preferred virtualization software.
Figure 2
VMware Screenshot

Next, connect to a network so that you can access the internet to download ShinoLocker.

Downloading Shinolocker may give you some issues since it is known as ransomware. You may
have to disable windows defender. You can do this by clicking more details when you are alerted
to the security issue by windows defender and then disabling your Real-time protection. Only do
this if you intend to have your files encrypted.
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Next, launch ShinoLocker and run it as administrator. You can see the program below.

Figure 3
Screenshot of Shinolocker program

At this point, any files matching the file extensions specified when you downloaded ShinoLocker
will be encrypted. Encrypted files will look like those shown below:
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Figure 4
Screenshot of Encrypted Files

You should now see the program above. From here, you can click the Get the key from the
ShinoLocker Server button. Next, click the Get the Key button on the ShinoLocker website.
Figure 5
Screenshot of decryption key retrieval

From here to the key will be displayed in a pop-up box.
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Figure 6
Screenshot of decryption key pop-up box

Copy and paste this key into the Shinolocker program to decrypt your files
Figure 7
Screenshot of decryption key input

Click the Decrypt Files and Uninstall Me button.
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Figure 8
Screenshot of Decrypt Files and Uninstall me button

Once your files are decrypted, Shinolocker will disappear/uninstall, and your files will be
restored.
Finding Ransomware on the Open Internet
Finding ransomware on the internet has become an almost trivial task due to the sheer volume of
attacks we have seen over the past few years. A simple google search for “GitHub ransomware
repository” will yield many results. However, it is not recommended to download these
programs as they can be highly unpredictable. The purpose of Joe's Sandbox and Virus Total.
These cloud-based malware analysis tools allow someone to analyze malware without potentially
risking their machine in the process. The first repository this research will analyze is the
Malware Repo public repository on GitHub hosted at https://github.com/Da2dalus/TheMALWARE-Repo. This research will be analyzing some of the different ransomware included
in this repo under the ransomware directory. Below is a screenshot of just some of the
ransomware included in this repository
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Figure 9
Screenshot of GitHub Ransomware Repository

To confirm these files are ransomware, I will run one of the files through the virus total using its
download URL. The results are shown below:
Figure 10
Screenshot of VirusTotal scan results
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Now that it is confirmed that this repository includes actual ransomware, is it usable? For most
users, this sort of ransomware would not be very usable. To serve an individual's purposes, it
would require a high level of technical expertise to modify ransomware source code, like the
files found in the git hub repository above. It would probably be easier for someone with the
required technical expertise to just write their original malware.
There are other options for an aspiring threat actor available on the open internet. RAASNet is
another repository that can be found on GitHub. RAASNet is a set of scripts that can generate
encryptor payloads, send them to targets, and decrypt a target's machine. It includes a GUI
Admin Dashboard with all sorts of statistics available for the threat actor to see about their
victims. The Github page even includes a link to an onion site that claims to host a complete
command and control system for aspiring threat actors to use. To conclude, the resources are out
there for those with the technical expertise to use them.
Real-World Ransomware Analysis
Introduction to Revil
Revil is the specific strain of ransomware chosen for analysis for this research. Throughout this
research, the term "Revil" will refer to a specific strain of ransomware. The ransomware group
that uses Revil goes by that name. The Revil ransomware group is thought to be based out of
eastern Europe. The group disappeared for a short stint back in July of 2021 (Tidy, 2021), only to
reappear a few months later in September of 2021 (Abrams, 2021).
Background Information
The specific attack this research will analyze is the Kaseya VSA attack in July of 2021 that
affected over 1000 different companies. The Kaseya VSA attack is unique due to the vast
number of compromised machines and organizations, with just one attack carried out by one
group. Additionally, the absurdly large scope of this attack is due to the nature and purpose of
Kaseya VSA software. Kaseya VSA is a remote monitoring and management solution marketed
to and used by IT managed service providers or MSPs. MSPs are third-party companies that
provide businesses with networking infrastructure, applications, and network security through
ongoing support and administration of systems per their service level agreement. Essentially
MSPs are a third party that businesses may contract to provide them with IT services.
Understanding this attack vector is important because ransomware attacks with a Third-Party
Liability are almost sure to involve insurance, increasing the chances of attackers receiving a
payout. These two factors combined, third party liability and many users affected, made Kaseya
VSA an incredibly enticing target for attackers.
Initial Access/Zero-Day
The Kaseya VSA attack leveraged an unpatched zero-day vulnerability in the Kaseya VSA
software to accomplish its objectives. According to the Spider Labs Blog, “This vulnerability has
been issued CVE-2021-30116 and was discovered and reported to Kaseya by a researcher for the
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Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD). Kaseya was actively working on a patch.
According to the DIVD, but not finalized before REvil discovered and exploited the issue. At
this point, it is still not clear what the actual issue is or how the exploit may work, although
initial reports suggest a potential authentication bypass." (Mendrez & Kazymirskyi, 2021)
Further details into the inner mechanisms of the zero-day vulnerability are hard to find and for a
good reason. According to the Dutch institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (the original research
organization that identified the vulnerability), "One of our researchers found multiple
vulnerabilities in Kaseya VSA. The researchers were in the process of responsible disclosure (or
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure) with Kaseya; before all these vulnerabilities could be
patched, a ransomware attack happened using Kaseya VSA. Ever since we released the news that
we indeed notified Kaseya of a vulnerability used in the ransomware attack, we have been
getting requests to release details about these vulnerabilities and the disclosure timeline.
However, in line with the guidelines for Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, we have not
disclosed any details so far. Furthermore, while we feel it is time to be more open about this
process and our decisions regarding this matter, we will still not release the full details"
(Oudshoorn, 2021).
While it may be challenging to get specific details about the vulnerability due to the coordinated
vulnerability disclosure guidelines, some information can still be gleaned from the official
disclosure documents. For example, according to the official CVE list hosted at cve.mitre.org,
for CVE-2021-30116, the vulnerability description is, "Kaseya VSA before 9.5.7 allows
credential disclosure, as exploited in the wild in July 2021" (CVE-2021-30116, 2021).
Furthermore, in another document produced by the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure,
CVE-2021-30116 is referred to as "a credentials leak and business logic flaw, to be included in
9.5.7" (Oudshoorn, 2021). By corroborating the information from these two sources, one can
infer that the attackers acquired valid credentials with high-level access to the Kaseya VSA
servers. Therefore, this vulnerability would fall under TA0001 Initial Access and T1078 Valid
Accounts in MITRE Attack Classification.
After the initial authentication bypass has been achieved using the zero-day vulnerability
discussed above, the attacker then uses the Kaseya VSA platform to drop a file (agent.crt) that is
base64 encoded to the Kaseya Working directory (C:/kworking), which will then be delivered as
part of a malicious hotfix update to the VSA agents running in managed Windows systems. This
would be classified as Technique T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software
Supply Chain and fall under TA0001 Initial Access for its MITRE classification.
Execution/PowerShell
The attack moves from the Kaseya VSA servers to the VSA Agents running in managed
Windows systems.
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First, a PowerShell command is launched by the C:/Program Files
(x86)\Kaseya\[id]\AgentMon.exe process. The AgentMon.exe process is a component of the
Kaseya VSA Agent Software, and as such, it has full administrator access. This action is a
component of the malicious update that was dropped in the previous section. PowerShell for
command execution would be classified as MITRE Attack Execution Technique T1059.001
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell. The PowerShell command is quoted below:
"C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 4979 > nul &
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Set-MpPreference DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true -DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true DisableIOAVProtection $true -DisableScriptScanning $true -EnableControlledFolderAccess
Disabled -EnableNetworkProtection AuditMode -Force -MAPSReporting Disabled SubmitSamplesConsent NeverSend & copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\certutil.exe
C:\Windows\cert.exe & echo %RANDOM% >> C:\Windows\cert.exe & C:\Windows\cert.exe decode c:\kworking\agent.crt c:\kworking\agent.exe & del /q /f c:\kworking\agent.crt
C:\Windows\cert.exe & c:\kworking\agent.exe” (Özarslan, 2021)
While this command may look like an impenetrable wall of text, it is easier to understand if
broken down into sections. The first section of the command, "/c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 4979 > null
&” may actually be “ /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n #diffSec# >> null”, but this varies depending on the
source. However, the intent of this section of the command remains the same regardless of the
source. It is a ping to the default loopback address that sleeps for the time defined by the diffs
variable determined by a calculation made when the malicious update initially infects the
machine. According to the huntress rapid response blog on the Kaseya VSA Incident, this
command "effectively coordinates a synchronized attack at exactly 1630 UTC across all victims”
(Hammond, 2021).
Next, the command disables Windows Defender's Real-Time Protection feature. This technique
is a well-known Defense Evasion Tactic, and it would be classified as TA0005 Defense Evasion
T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools. This is done with the following section of
the command:
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Set-MpPreference DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
Next, the command disables other features of windows defender, such as scanning of
downloaded files, scanning of scripts during malware scans, the intrusion prevention system, and
more. This is done with the following section of the command:
-DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem $true -DisableIOAVProtection $true -DisableScriptScanning
$true -EnableControlledFolderAccess Disabled -EnableNetworkProtection AuditMode -Force MAPSReporting Disabled -SubmitSamplesConsent NeverSend

14

After impairing Windows Defender, the PowerShell command copies the certutil.exe file from
the C:\Windows\System32 directory and pastes it in the C:\Windows\ directory as cert.exe. Once
cert.exe has been created, the PowerShell command appends a random number to the end of the
cert.exe filename to evade hash-based detection rules. The alteration of the location and file
name of cert.exe would be classified as MITRE Attack Defense Evasion Tactics. Specifically,
this action is Technique T1036 Masquerading. This is done with the following section of the
command:
& copy /Y C:\Windows\System32\certutil.exe C:\Windows\cert.exe & echo %RANDOM% >>
C:\Windows\cert.exe
Next, the PowerShell command decodes the base64 encoded agent. crt file dropped earlier and
saved it as agent.exe. Decoding an obfuscated file would be classified as MITRE Attack
Technique T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information during the initial obfuscation of the
agent. crt file would be classified as MITRE Attack Defense Evasion Technique T1027
Obfuscated File or Information. The decoding is done with the following section of the
command:
& C:\Windows\cert.exe -decode c:\kworking\agent.crt c:\kworking\agent.exe
Next, the PowerShell command removes the agent.crt and cert.exe files. This action falls under
MITRE Attack Defense Evasion Technique T1070.004, Indicator Removal on Host: File
Deletion. This action is taken to minimize the attacker's footprint. This is done with the
following section of the command:
& del /q /f c:\kworking\agent.crt C:\Windows\cert.exe
Lastly, the PowerShell command executes the now decoded/deobfuscated agent.exe file. The
agent.exe file is digitally signed using a valid certificate from "PB03 Transport LTD". The use of
a valid certificate falls under MITRE Attack Defense Evasion Technique T1553.002 Subvert
Trust Controls: Code Signing. This bypasses potential security policies that require a program to
be signed with a valid certificate to run on a system. It is currently unknown how the attacker
acquired the key required to sign the code. This is done with the following section of the
command:
& c:\kworking\agent.exe”
Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Impact
The launching of the agent.exe file concludes the PowerShell section of the attack. Next, the
Agent.exe file extracts two different embedded binaries. These files are named MsMpEng.exe
and mpsvc.dll. When the agent.exe file is executed, these files are extracted to the C:\Windows
directory. The file MsMpEng.exe is a legitimate Microsoft Defender executable file. To be
specific, it is version 4.5.218.0 signed by Microsoft on March 23, 2014. (Columbia SPS, 2021).
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Why would attackers want to install an antivirus program on a target machine during their
attack? The answer is simpler than you would think. This specific version of Windows Defender
has a vulnerability to DLL side loading, and as such, it is used to launch the other file previously
embedded in Agent.exe, mpsvc.dll. The action would be classified as MITRE Attack Persistence,
Privilege Escalation, and Defense Evasion Technique T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Side-Loading. When MsMpEng.exe runs, it uses the mpsvc.dll to load an exported function from
a Malicious library. Next, the function loads the ransomware payload into the system memory
and executes it. This action would be classified as MITRE Attack Impact Technique T1486 Data
Encrypted for Impact.
MITRE ATT&CK Breakdown
Below is a list of the MITRE ATT&CK Techniques and Tactics used in this attack:
Initial Access:
•
•

T1078 Valid Accounts
T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

Execution
•

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell.

Persistence
•

T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading

Privilege Escalation
•

T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading

Defense Evasion
•
•
•
•
•
•

T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1036.003 Masquerading: Rename System Utilities
T1027 Obfuscated File or Information.
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1070.004, Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing.

Summary
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The Kaseya VSA attack is characterized primarily by its emphasis on defense evasion techniques
and its wholly automated process for infecting a machine. This approach comes with positives
and negatives for the attackers. The positive aspect of this approach is that due to its automated
and synchronized nature, all systems are infected simultaneously, reducing the chance for
countermeasures to be developed. The negative aspect of this approach is that the lack of "touch"
involved in this attack means that only a small percentage of vulnerable servers were
compromised. Many vulnerable systems avoided the attack simply due to misconfigurations. The
following graphic was taken from the Spider Labs Blog,
Figure 11
Post-Exploitation Execution Flow Chart
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Note: (Mendrez & Kazymirskyi, 2021)
This graphic does a good job of creating a visual representation of the process flow of the
Kaseya VSA attack. First, the compromised Kaseya VSA Update servers send out a malicious
update to a Kaseya Agent Monitor. This update drops the agent.crt file and then executes the
PowerShell command. Once the agent. crt file is decoded; it is then executed. Next, agent.exe
drops MsMpEng.exe and mpsvc.dll and then use MsMpEng.exe to dll sideload mpscd.dll.
Mpsvc.dll then loads into memory and executes the encryptor payload.
Technology Based Solutions
In this section, this research will recommend solutions and prevention, and mitigation measures
regarding ransomware attacks. The topics covered within this section will include backups,
Endpoint Detection, Least Privilege Access, Antivirus software, Intrusion Prevention Systems,
and User training.
Backups
Backups have always been the number one solution to dealing with ransomware attacks. Since a
ransomware attack aims to encrypt your systems to deny you use, a simple solution is to back up
all your business's critical resources. However, ransomware has been developed in recent years
that targets your central systems resources and any potential backups on-site. Due to the uptick in
this recent trend, the new recommendation is to have Air-Gapped Backups. Air gapped backups
are kept in a system disconnected from the internet and all networks except a local/private
internal network. By storing backups in this manner, an administrator can ensure that the
backups will not be tampered with even if the primary network/system has been compromised.
Endpoint Detection and Response
Endpoint Detection and Response sometimes referred to as an EDR, is a software solution that
continually monitors and responds to mitigate security threats. This is done by installing an agent
on each endpoint, and the agent then sends behavioral data to the central database for analysis.
Modern Day EDR's have started to use Artificial Intelligence to assist in the analysis of
behavioral data. First, Artificial Intelligence analyzes an extensive data set to establish a baseline
for endpoint behavior. Once the baseline has been set, any endpoint behavior that goes outside of
the established baseline sends an alert to an administrator.
Antivirus
This point cannot be stressed enough, primarily because of how effortless it is. First, an
organization must keep whatever antivirus software they choose to use up to date. This is usually
done through a scheduled task that runs at the end of the week to check for updates. Keeping
antivirus up to date helps to prevent users from unintentionally installing malicious software, and
as such, the value of it cannot be overstated. During the demonstration section of this research,
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the value of antivirus software is quite evident due to how difficult it is to install malicious
software even when it is done intentionally.
User Training
User Training is of paramount significance in today's current landscape of cybersecurity. The
importance of User Training is due to the prevalence of phishing tactics used by threat actors.
NIST defines phishing as " A technique for attempting to acquire sensitive data, such as bank
account numbers, through a fraudulent solicitation in email or on a web site, in which the
perpetrator masquerades as a legitimate business or reputable person" (NIST CSRC, Phishing glossary). Phishing is one of the most common ways for a threat actor to steal a target's
credentials. Threat actors commonly use phishing because it does not rely on any technical
vulnerabilities; it relies on the so-called Human Vulnerability of a system. A threat actor does not
need to use complicated tactics to acquire credentials when they can easily acquire them through
phishing. Since phishing is an entirely human vulnerability, the only solution for it is user
training. This can be done in a variety of ways. A prevalent user training method is for the
security team to conduct phishing campaigns to test the users in an organization. You can
identify users requiring more training and reward those who successfully identify the phishing
emails by conducting phishing campaigns.
Intrusion Prevention Systems
An Intrusion Prevention System, often referred to as an IPS, is defined by NIST as "a system
which can detect an intrusive activity and can also attempt to stop the activity, ideally before it
reaches the target." (NIST, Intrusion prevention system (IPS) - glossary) An IPS can help to
prevent malicious software from spreading throughout your network. Most IPSs continuously
monitor the network and compare it to an established network performance/statistics baseline.
Whenever the IPS detects something malicious, it alerts a security analyst and takes what actions
it can to prevent the event from impacting the network. Many of the newer ransomware strains
have some form of self-propagation. The only way to detect and respond to these incidents
quickly is by using an Intrusion Prevention System or an Intrusion Detection System. IPS/IDS
systems come in various forms, some are network-based, and others are host-based. The decision
between a host-based and a network-based IPS entirely depends on the sorts of systems you are
trying to secure. It is not uncommon to see an organization implement both types of IPS in a
large-scale enterprise environment.
Policy Based Solutions
Almost any organization that uses computer in the modern-day landscape can benefit from
having a security policy. Security Policy is a very broad topic so this research will not attempt to
cover it in its entirety. Instead, this research aims to address the specific pieces of security policy
that are helpful in countering ransomware attacks.

19

Least Privilege Access
Least Privilege Access is the concept of giving users the least amount of privilege they need to
do their job. This is typically done by giving read-only access to everyone other than designated
power users. By implementing a policy of least privilege access, an organization can drastically
reduce the attack surface of their systems. Least Privilege Access also ensures that if standard
user accounts are compromised, the damage will be minimal. Suppose an attacker wants to gain
meaningful access to a system with a least privilege access policy to do any real damage. In that
case, they must target an administrator, or some other kind of power used to get sufficient
credentials. This policy will not prevent an attack from happening, but it helps put more
obstacles in an attacker's path.
Security Audits
Security Audits have only recently become standard practice for all organizations. A security
audit is defined by NIST as an, “Independent review and examination of a system’s records and
activities to determine the adequacy of system controls, ensure compliance with established
security policy and procedures, detect breaches in security services, and recommend any changes
that are indicated for countermeasures.” (NIST, Security Audit - Glossary) Essentially the
purpose of an audit is to ensure that an organization is following its own security policy as well
as any laws and or regulations that may apply to the organization. By conducting audits on a
regular basis an organization can ensure that it is following its own guidelines and best practices
dictated in the security policy as well as any legal requirements the organization might have. An
audit is also helpful for identifying areas in which a company can improve its security policy to
fit better within industry standards. Annual security audits should be conducted by a licensed and
certified third-party contractor. Internal security audits can also be performed by the internal
security team, however an external organization must conduct security audits if they are for the
purposes of Governance, Risk, and Compliance or legal requirements. Different industries have
different legal requirements based on a variety of factors such as the sensitivity of the data that
they are handling or the organizations status as a contractor for the federal government.
Incident Response Plan
An Incident Response Plan is defined by NIST as, “The documentation of a predetermined set of
instructions or procedures to detect, respond to, and limit consequences of a malicious cyber
attacks against an organization’s information systems(s).” (NIST, Incident response plan glossary) An Incident Response Plan should contain all of the materials your organization
requires should an incident occur. An Incident Response Plan should contain the structure of the
incident response team, the roles of each member on the team, and the assigned responsibilities
for each role. In addition to this it should also include a framework to abide by during the
incident response process, the standard frameworks used are the NIST Incident Response
Process and the SANS Incident Response Process. These Frameworks define the stages and
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procedures within an incident response plan. The incident response plan should also include
examples of incidents and definitions of incident severity ratings.
Disaster Recovery Plan
A Disaster Recovery Plan is similar to an incident response plan but also quite different. The
purpose of a Disaster Recovery Plan is not to respond to an incident, instead its purpose is to get
your systems back online in a timely and orderly fashion. An Incident Response Plan defines
how an organization will respond to an incident; Disaster Recovery defines how the organization
will go about getting it systems back online. NIST defines Disaster Recovery as, “A written plan
for processing critical applications in the event of a major hardware or software failure or
destruction of facilities.” (NIST, Disaster recovery plan (DRP) - glossary) It is hard to define
what a normal disaster recovery plan contains because it is almost entirely dependent on the
context and circumstances of the particular organization in which it applies. A Disaster Recovery
Plan may attempt to provide a blueprint to recovering from service disruptions such as
Ransomware, Environmental Catastrophes (tornados, hurricanes, earthquakes, fires), Building
Accessibility, Power Disruption, Hardware Failures, Software Failures, and Employee Errors. A
disaster recovery plan should be tested at least once yearly to ensure that it will function
properly.
Backup Testing
If an organization uses backups to mitigate security risk, then it should also test its backups. If
the backups aren’t tested, then how can anyone know if they will work? Backup testing has been
around for a while, but only recently became relevant due to the threat of ransomware. If an
organization has backups, it is recommended to test them at least once yearly. This will ensure
that if a situation arises in which you need to use your backups, they will work. Without backup
testing it is impossible to know if your backups will work when you need them to. If your
organization is heavily reliant on backups for disaster recovery it advisable to recommend
backup testing semiannually or even quarterly. Guidelines for how often an organization should
test their backups should be dictated within either the organizations general security policy or the
disaster recovery plan. Back Up Testing should ideally be a component of an organization’s
Disaster Recovery Testing.
Vulnerability Scanning
Vulnerability scanning is an incredibly useful tool for an organization’s security team.
Vulnerability scanning is defined by NIST as, “A technique used to identify hosts/host attributes
and associated vulnerabilities.” The reason vulnerability scanning is such a valuable tool is
because it gives an organization security team a rare opportunity to examine the network from
the perspective of an attacker. Vulnerability scanning may also help with patch management
which will be discussed in the next paragraph. By routinely running vulnerability scans on the
network an organization’s security team can ensure that it is at the very least aware of all
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vulnerabilities throughout the systems. Vulnerability scanning tools are available for free, but
there are also organizations that sell proprietary vulnerability scanning software. Free
vulnerability scanning programs should be sufficient for most small and medium sized
organizations. An organization should have a section in its security policy for vulnerability
scanning. The policy should include how often scans will be conducted, roles, responsibilities,
and identification of the vulnerability scanning team, the systems to be scanned, and
documentation identifying current vulnerabilities in the system as well as ranking them on levels
of severity.
Patch Management
Many vulnerabilities are the result of unpatched software. Whenever a vulnerability is
discovered by a security researcher it is reported to the supplier who then works on fixing the
software. Once they have fixed the vulnerability, the supplier releases what is known as a patch.
A patch is an update to the software that aims to fix newly discovered issues. A patch may
sometimes also be referred to as a bug fix or a hot fix in popular media. The distribution and
application of these patches throughout an organizations network is called Patch Management.
An organization security policy should have a section addressing patch management. The section
should include an inventory of your systems, roles, responsibilities, and identification of the
patch management team, details on the patch management software and deployment, a patch
testing policy, a patching schedule, and documentation of the process. By implementing a robust
patch management policy an organization can ensure that its systems will not be running
vulnerable patches of software unless absolutely necessary.
Hypothesis Analysis
Accessibility/How easy is it to find ransomware?
This was discussed briefly in a previous section but finding ransomware on the internet is quite
an easy task if you know where to look. The most obvious and easy answer to finding an
example of actual ransomware is to look on google search "GitHub ransomware repositories,"
and you will find what you are looking for. If the goal is to find a specific strain on ransomware,
then the task is not beginner-friendly, but the information is still there. A minor detail worthy of
consideration is that any ransomware found on the internet with ease will be detected by the most
recent Antivirus Solutions and EDR systems. Threat intelligence is the cybersecurity sector
responsible for supplying antivirus software and EDR solutions with large amounts of data on
nearly all malware used in recent times. In summary, if you can find a piece of pre-written
malware on the internet, it will probably set off some alarm.
Ease of Use
So, it has been established that finding ransomware is a trivial task. However, this poses the
question, what can the average person do with access to this malicious software? Unfortunately,
the answer is not much. The average user has no business attempting to deploy malware. The
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only way an average person could successfully deploy ransomware is with someone with
expertise supplied pre-written software. While this may sound like something out of a spy
thriller, there is some precedence for insider attacks in the real world. However, insider attacks
can be countered by following best practices like least privilege access and physical access
control and software like a Behavior-Based XDR Solution.
How Dangerous?
Ransomware poses a unique and ever-evolving threat in the cybersecurity sector. Prior to the
ransomware threat, there was no substantial financial incentive to become a threat actor.
Nevertheless, ransomware has existed since the 1990s, so how does that make any sense?
Cryptocurrency. The proliferation of cryptocurrency is the primary reason for the new interest in
ransomware by threat actors across the globe. It represents a way to get paid without dealing
with banks, police, or anything representing a traditional institution. A hacker can infect a
target's system, receive the ransom payment, and decrypt the system without leaving their seat,
and it is thanks, at least in part, to cryptocurrency. Many governments have begun to crack down
on cryptocurrency, but that is easier said than done due to the technology's decentralized nature.
In summary, due to the significant financial incentives, it is expected that ransomware will
continue to proliferate and pose a sizeable economic threat to developed nations. Systems will
always have vulnerabilities, and someone will always click a link they know they should not; this
is why having a layered security approach is essential. The risks posed by ransomware will
continue to grow if the financial incentive remains.
Discussion
There is a political aspect to the issue of ransomware that is seldomly talked about in public
circles and is generally only known to those in the cyber security field. However, it is an
essential detail when addressing the threat of ransomware on a global level. It is all but
confirmed that Russia and other Eastern European countries in the Russian Sphere of influence
are giving ransomware operators safe harbor if they refrain from targeting entities that would be
considered allies. This conclusion is supported by a common feature of any Ransomware that
comes out of Eastern Europe. There are a variety of forms of ransomware written by Revil that
will not run on a system that has a default language that is native to eastern Europe. By including
this threat, actors ensure that they do not jeopardize their haven in Russia. By implementing this
all but confirms that the ransomware operators are government-sanctioned. If these operators
indeed are sanctioned on some level by the Russian government, then Russia represents the most
significant roadblock to apprehending ransomware operators in the entire world. The FBI can
take down as many dark-web websites as they want to, but their efforts amount to nothing if they
cannot apprehend the individuals responsible for the operation. If these criminals cannot be
apprehended, then ransomware will continue to be a sizeable threat for the foreseeable future.
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Conclusion
To conclude, the threat of ransomware only grows day by day. While it may be easy to find, the
creation, implementation, and configuration require significant technical expertise. Your first
line of defense against ransomware and any malware should be user training. Many IT
professionals see users as a vulnerability. However, well-trained users are an invaluable asset.
Well-trained users help make the job of a system administrator easier by helping to alert the
system administrator when they notice something is off. User-Training is the difference between
having users that serve as vulnerabilities to your system's security and having users that serve as
an asset to the security of your system. Backups are your last line of defense. Backups alone do
not make you immune to ransomware attacks, as many would lead you to believe. If you want
your backups to be "ransomware-proof," they need to either be air-gapped on-site or stored offsite in a completely different location. If Backups are integral to an organization's disaster
recovery plan, it is conceivable to recommend both. Antivirus is the standard defense against
malware; it is inconceivable to use computers without antivirus in today's world of cyber
security. If cybersecurity is integral to your organization, it is recommended that you implement
some form of EDR solution and some form of IPS solution. These two technologies are at the
core of a modern cyber security architecture. To summarize, ransomware is incredibly dangerous
in the right hands, and to defend against it, an organization must take a layered approach to
security. Additionally, ransomware will continue to be a problem in the foreseeable future as
long as Russia gives operators safe harbor and allows anonymous financial transfers.
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